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Introduction 
 
The global rise of economic inequality has become an increasingly prevalent theme in the 
economics and sociology literatures. Much of the focus of this work has been on the 
uncovering of statistical evidence that economic inequality exists, and is increasing. A 
growing body of research including Jencks et al. (1979), Stiglitz (2013), Dorling (2010, 
2014) and Piketty (2014) overwhelmingly suggests that overall improvements in aggregate 
wealth are in fact associated with increases in inequality. For example, the share of wealth in 
the United States enjoyed by the top 0.1% grew from 7% in 1979 to 22% in 2012 (Saez & 
Zucman, 2014).  In 1965, CEOs of major American companies earned 10 or 18 times more 
than the typical worker, depending on the compensation measure; by 2012, it had increased to 
202-to-1 or 273-to-1 respectively (Mishel & Sabadish, 2013). These figures become even 
more extreme in the financial sector. In 2004, for example, the combined income of the top 
25 hedge fund managers was greater than the combined income of all CEOs of S&P 500 
firms (Kaplan & Rauh, 2010). Further, of the top 0.1 percent of income earners, 18.4% 
worked in finance or were executives, managers and supervisors of financial firms (Bakija, 
Cole & Heim, 2012). 
The extreme levels of inequality are starkly borne out in the anti-poverty charity Oxfam’s 
(2016) report that the proportion of the world’s wealth owned by the top 1% has continued to 
dramatically increase. In fact, Oxfam reports that the 62 wealthiest people in the world own 
the same amount as the least well off 3.5 billion, or 50% of the world’s population. Further, 
the wealth of these 62 people increased by 44% between 2010 and 2015 while that of the 
bottom 3.5 billion fell by 41% over the same period. 
If the recent rise in inequality is now well established, what is also increasingly recognized is 
that it appears to have hugely detrimental consequences. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) have 
demonstrated that higher levels of inequality are correlated with a wide variety of undesirable 
consequences including lower life expectancies, greater levels of community dysfunction, 
greater levels of drug use, more mental health problems, poorer physical health, greater 
obesity rates, increased levels of violence, lower levels of educational performance, higher 
rates of imprisonment, and lower levels of social mobility. 
Such patterns of inequality seem to perpetuate themselves not just in society in general but 
within organizations too. The “working poor,” while “seemingly indispensable to the value 
creation model for firms in developed economies” (Leana et al., 2012: 901) appear to have 
little chance of advancing beyond their current circumstances (see also Mair et al., 2012 for a 
similar argument in developing economies). Further, despite decades of awareness, women 
remain discriminated against in many organizations, leading to a perpetuation of unequal pay 
and severe under-representation in senior management positions (Belliveau, 2012; Ryan & 
Haslam, 2007). Racial disparities (Carton & Rosette, 2011; Cortina, 2008), sexual harassment 
(Berdahl, 2007; Raver & Gelfand, 2005), discrimination against stigmatized and 
marginalized individuals and groups (Martí & Fernández, 2013; Soule, 2012) and 
exploitation that leads to “body breakdowns” (Michel, 2011) have also been reported as 
outcomes of formal and informal policies of exploitation and inequality. 
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These patterns of inequality are engendered by deeply entrenched power structures that are 
manifest in institutionalized beliefs and rules that dominate social and economic life. These 
include economic and political ideologies, the class system, gender roles, social structures, 
discourses, and subject positions that have themselves reified societal inequalities. Mair et al. 
(2012: 820), for example, provide an evocative analysis of the ways in which social 
inequalities in developing countries are reinforced as market access and opportunities are 
governed by local institutional arrangements that “consist of complex interlocks of formal 
institutions, such as constitutions, laws, property rights, and governmental regulations, and 
informal institutions, such as customs, traditions, and religious beliefs.” To date, however, the 
institutional arrangements underpinning, and dynamics of, inequality have been largely 
overlooked. 
It is this agenda that we take up in our chapter. In doing so, we are responding to recent 
polemics, prescriptions and calls to engage more with substantive societal problems (e.g., 
Bapuji, 2015; Dover & Lawrence, 2010; George, McGahan & Prahbu, 2012; Gulati, 2007; 
Hinings & Greenwood, 2002; Lorsch, 2009; Mair & Martí, 2006; Munir, 2011, 2015; Riaz, 
2015; Seelos & Mair, 2007; Starkey & Madan, 2001; Von Glinow, 2005). We believe that the 
potential for institutional scholars to inform understanding of the mechanisms that exacerbate 
or reduce inequality is significant; similarly, the study of inequality poses fundamental 
questions for institutional theory. 
The problem of increasing inequality appears to stem, at least in part, from the growing 
disparity between stagnating wages of lower-level employees on the one hand and rapid 
wealth accumulation by the rich on the other (e.g., Lansley 2012; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 
2013). This in turn has been causally linked to two related phenomena, the first of which is 
the influence of corporations. Barley (2007) argued that many corporations wield inordinate 
influence over policy-making, hamper the performance of institutions created to protect the 
public from corporate excesses and, together with various multilateral institutions, push for 
increased privatization of public services. One example of a firm that is arguably intent on 
increasing its influence on public policy in the US and Europe is Google, with concerns 
raised about the firm’s strategy of recruiting former government insiders, and in turn seeing 
several former employees appointed to political positions (Doward, 2016). While Barley 
(2007) particularly emphasizes the effects of large corporations, Davis (2016) argues that in 
fact an economy dominated by a number of large corporations has been replaced by what he 
calls a “gig economy” with an emphasis on flexible work. However, these organizations 
designed to be more responsive to environmental changes also have the potential to increase 
disparities between those in professional occupations or senior leadership positions, and those 
reliant on short-term, temporary, and non-guaranteed contracts. Thus, whether large and 
traditional, technology-intensive, and/or more flexible, corporations, in varied ways, are 
employing strategies that are apparently increasing levels of inequality. 
The second antecedent for the increasing prevalence of inequality has been the 
financialization of the economy (Davis, 2009; Lansley, 2012; Stiglitz, 2013). Precipitated 
most notably by the emphasis on deregulation of the financial industry in the 1980s by the 
governments of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA, financial 
institutions became characterized by the aggressive pursuit of short-term policies aimed at 
increasing wealth maximization. Such an approach, inevitably, spilled over into other 
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industries such that shareholder return has become, in many cases, the sole driver of 
corporate strategies. As Burgin (2012: 214) documented, “the rise of deregulation in the 
1970s and the subsequent election of Ronald Reagan had ushered in nearly thirty years during 
which the primacy of free markets was largely assumed.” Chang (2011) is among those who 
have pointed to the ways in which such a philosophy is explicitly oriented to have a positive 
impact on minority shareholders and senior managers at the expense of lower-level 
employees and long-term corporate well-being. Imperatives such as employment conditions, 
economic mobility, and employee benefits have, by contrast, been consistently overlooked 
(Stout, 2012).  
In the context of these observations, our purpose in this chapter is to open up possibilities for 
developing institutional explanations for the persistence of inequality. We believe this will 
lead to a more holistic understanding of the causes of inequality, and in turn a more robust 
conceptualization of possible prescriptions. To this end, we draw upon four different streams 
of work within institutional theory to provide a conceptual framework for an institutional 
understanding of inequality. Our intent is not to provide detailed theoretical expositions of 
each stream – these are carried out in detail elsewhere in this book – but rather to uncover the 
ways in which an institutional infrastructure has emerged to create a society in which 
inequality is widely seen as inevitable. The four perspectives are selected, and ordered, to 
cumulatively build a detailed understanding of how institutions and inequality are 
inextricably interlinked. We begin by examining the institutional microfoundations of 
inequality. Our focus here is on uncovering the ways in which inequality becomes reified in 
everyday actions and interactions by and among individuals. We build out from a focus on 
individuals to consider how the discourse that people produce structures social life and in so 
doing creates a context in which systems of inequality can flourish but can also be potentially 
challenged. The third section focuses upon institutional logics, the material and symbolic 
constructions underpinned by a shared set of values, norms, and assumptions that help 
determine what are considered to be appropriate, and inappropriate, courses of action. In so 
doing, the taken-for-granted social structures that have resulted in inequality are investigated. 
This allows us, in our final section, to examine the role of identity in the creation and 
maintenance of inequality. Implicated here are the ways in which social constructions such as 
gender, class, race, disability and status create expectations of how we and others should 
behave in particular situations. In adopting this structure, we show how four of the most 
dominant perspectives in institutional theory are mutually interlinked to create an 
environment in which inequality has become a taken-for-granted feature of everyday life, and 
how those institutions that underpin inequality might be reframed.  
 
The Microfoundations of Inequality 
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is 
ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually slaves of some defunct economist” (Keynes, 1936: 
383). 
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An important consideration for those interested in the perpetuation of inequality is how the 
dynamics of everyday life in organizational and field settings can reify and institutionalize 
particular social structures. Resonating with efforts to attend to the microfoundations of 
institutions and institutional processes (e.g., see Barley, this volume; Powell & Rerup, this 
volume), this is a broader theoretical concern at the forefront of institutional scholarship and 
one that we consider here. In particular, we first investigate the ways in which inequality is 
experienced and reinforced from repeated, often mundane, everyday organizational practices. 
Second, we assess the ways in which practices that lead to, and accentuate, inequality spread 
within and across institutional fields. 
 
Reproducing practices of inequality 
Understanding how practices become institutionalized has long been at the heart of 
institutional theory. However, as Martí and Mair (2009: 98) explained in their discussion of 
the perpetuation of poverty, “there is a need to unpack the institutional forces that make 
policies so persistent and to understand how to act upon them…. Studying how the wide 
array of legacy institutions, traditions, myths and customary practices that underlie policy are 
reproduced and maintained, and by whom, is of utmost importance.” Understanding how 
such “institutions, traditions, myths, and customary practices” are constructed and reproduced 
will, we contend, provide insight into the escalation and perpetuation of inequality. 
Institutions are produced, and reproduced, through the situated, everyday activities of 
individuals. Members of organizations ascribe meaning to actions and, in so doing develop 
taken-for-granted understandings (Powell & Rerup, this volume). Thus, when becoming 
institutionalized, practices that would otherwise be considered quite banal and unremarkable 
are imbued with a meaning informed by broader cultural beliefs (Lounsbury & Crumley, 
2007; Thornton et al., 2012). Powell and Covylas (2008) suggested that insights from 
ethnomethodology, sensemaking, interaction rituals, performativity, and status expectations 
can help us understand how this process takes place. In each case, they argue, we gain 
exposure to the sequences of individual actions and decisions that constitute the building 
blocks of microfoundations of institutions and institutional processes. We argue that the 
unveiling of the microfoundations underpinning inequality would have great utility in helping 
us understand the ways in which inequality becomes established and subsequently 
reproduced, and how they might also be unpicked. For example, in contrast to the popular 
image of processes underpinning institutional change as muscular, radical or triggered by 
external jolts, Mair and Hehenberger (2014) provide insight into the mundane and gradual 
processes that became rationalized and taken-for-granted as strategies to alleviate poverty and 
fight inequality. In particular, they show the importance of collective action by dissimilar 
actors in bringing about change, but also demonstrate how such action is only possible by 
reframing constituents’ practices in such a way that neutralizes opposition from groups with 
disparate interests. 
Further insight into the microfoundations of inequality can be gained by examining the ways 
in which changes to the socio-economic environment in which firms operate has led to a 
change in the structure of workforces in many firms. At the operational level, firms have 
engaged in strategies that have led to the outsourcing of manufacturing, the employment of 
staff on temporary rather than full-time contracts, and the general stagnation of wages. By 
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contrast, senior and chief executives have seen their wages and bonuses climb, particularly in 
the US (Stiglitz, 2013). On the one hand, such steps can be seen as straightforward responses 
to competitive pressures. However, as such practices are repeated within and across 
organizations, are permeated by interlocking boards, become reinforced by complementary 
practices, are reported on by the media, become topics of conversation inside and outside 
organizations, and so on, they become constituted within a broader cultural understanding of 
what is considered normal, and become meaningful. In other words, practices take on a 
symbolic value of being representative of good management practice. In fact, not following 
such practices is seen as unusual, even bizarre. A good illustration of the way in which new 
micropractices became institutionalized and had a major impact on inequality is provided by 
the recent financial crisis. Ray Perman’s (2013) book on the rise and fall of the Bank of 
Scotland in the UK is beautifully illustrative in this regard. 
 
The Bank of Scotland 
Perman (2013) starts out by pointing out how banks have traditionally been highly 
conservative organisations that ascribed to the maxim “lend short and borrow long.” In other 
words, capital to be borrowed by a bank should be on terms that allow repayment over a 
relatively long period, while money should be lent only over short timeframes. The principle 
underlying this was that any bank that fails to maintain its liquidity is extremely vulnerable. 
Of course, such a value proposition mitigates against practices such as mortgage lending in 
which lent capital is typically tied up for periods of up to, and beyond, 25 years. Following 
the deregulation of financial services in 1986, the UK financial industry fundamentally 
changed. Among other things, building societies, the traditional mortgage lenders, saw 
opportunities to engage in the provision of other financial services that had been the preserve 
of banks. By contrast, leaders of banks began to look at how they might also expand their 
services, and began to view mortgages and other forms of lending as potentially lucrative. In 
1995, the Bank of Scotland celebrated its tercentenary, an occasion marked by the Financial 
Times calling it “the most boring bank in Scotland”, something that it noted had allowed it to 
enjoy 300 years of consistent profitability and to “outperform the sector by nearly 100 per 
cent since 1980” (quoted in Perman, 2013: 50). A series of decisions illustrates how the 
bank’s operating values changed. 
In 2001 the Bank of Scotland merged with the Halifax Building Society to create HBOS. 
Rather than slow, organic “boring” growth, this marked a strategy of aggressive expansion in 
an attempt to compete with the “big four” banks in the UK: HSBC, Lloyds, Barclays, and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland. James Crosby, the new CEO, instructed his staff to pursue rapid 
growth in each of their main market areas. To achieve this, the previous conservatism was 
replaced by a much greater tolerance for risk. Lending standards were relaxed, with decisions 
taken to offer unsecured personal loans, increased credit card lending, and high-risk 
‘specialist’ mortgages – including self-certified, buy-to-let and 125 per cent mortgages. In 
fact, to achieve sales targets, it was common practice – at HBOS and elsewhere – for bank 
staff to help potential mortgage customers lie on their applications about their income levels 
in order to secure bigger loans. 
Another action that further entrenched the new way of banking was the appointment in June 
2005 of a new Chief Operating Officer (COO). Rather than banking stalwart George 
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Mitchell, the bank appointed Andy Hornby, a 38 year old with limited banking experience, as 
COO and heir apparent to Crosby. Hornby had brought with him to HBOS the sales approach 
he had developed during his retailing experience with grocery chain Asda. Among other 
things, he was (in)famous for his monthly staff newsletter, which always ended with the 
instruction to “Keep smiling, keep selling.” To further improve market share, prices on new 
products were cut (unsustainably) wafer thin as the bank pursued market share at any price. 
Those staff at the bank who tried to instill a more cautious approach were fired, actions that 
were as much symbolic as instrumental in the further reification of the new values. Despite 
the looming recession, and increasing numbers of bank customers suffering financial 
hardships, bank employees were still expected to hit their sales targets primarily by selling 
new products to existing customers; in some cases, the already difficult-to-hit targets were 
increased for retail staff. 
In retrospect, the constellation of actions described above served as microfoundations for 
institutional change in the banking industry. While at one level, each of the changes in 
practice could be considered a response to competitive market forces, we can see clear 
institutional drivers and effects. There were pronounced changes to the values that had guided 
banking practices, from a conservative attitude to lending allied with careful organic growth, 
to a very aggressive pursuit of profits and desire for rapid growth in market share. This value 
change – unsurprisingly – was accompanied with shifts in norms of behavior and 
assumptions about how a modern bank should act. Further, these changes went almost 
entirely unchallenged. Chang (2011: 4) explains that the “free market” is anything but free. 
Rather practices are underpinned by expectations, understandings, and rules of engagement 
that are established and reified. “We accept the legitimacy of certain regulations so totally 
that we don’t see them. More carefully examined, markets are revealed to be propped up by 
rules – and many of them.” While some of these “rules” were codified in legislative changes, 
others emerged from the day-to-day practices that become accepted and taken-for-granted as 
appropriate ways of acting.  
If HBOS had been the only bank to embrace this new ideology of capital accumulation, then 
its impact on the economy might have been relatively minor. However, the new approach to 
banking had spread like a contagion across the industry. The upshot was a failure in the 
banking system from Iceland to Ireland, the USA to the UK, eventually leading to a 
worldwide financial collapse.  
This collective outcome was not a direct result of market liberalization policies. It was 
mediated and made possible by rituals, subcultures and identities that emerged to make it all 
intelligible and indeed desirable to the participants. Those in the financial industries were 
lauded, particularly investment bankers who regarded themselves as Masters of the Universe, 
occupying the commanding heights of the economy. Their identities were reinforced by their 
military like intense socialization in a “white collar sweatshop” convincing them that they 
were the smartest, and hardest working, young people in society and deserved every ounce of 
success that came their way (Ho, 2009). In her brilliant ethnography of Wall Street, Ho 
(2009:152) described how the concept of shareholder value became “decontextualized, 
naturalized and globalized” by institutional actors, particularly economists. “Reckless 
expediency” and shifting risk on to other people became an institutionalized practice on Wall 
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Street. Any talk of “redistribution” of the massive amounts of wealth being generated was 
openly derided and derogatively labeled as being socialist. 
As the financial crisis played out, the effects of decisions made in banks such as HBOS 
became apparent. In a very sobering manner, the financial crisis illustrated how seemingly 
isolated decisions made in response to a perceived business pressure or opportunity can 
become exponentially magnified as new practices become institutionalized. The emergence 
of these new practices, of course, did not take place in a vacuum, but in a culture in which, 
particularly in the UK and USA, people had been encouraged from 1980 on to buy shares, 
borrow money to purchase houses that were almost unaffordable, and pursue wealth 
generating opportunities. This was a socio-economic environment in which greed was not 
seen as problematic, and in which the financial industry was lauded as traditional industries, 
such as manufacturing and mining, declined (Collins, 2007; Dobbin & Zorn, 2005; 
Thompson, 2007). The shifts in banking practice ultimately resulted in hundreds of thousands 
of people losing their jobs as banks struggled to survive, loans were called in, and lines of 
credit for business closed; thousands more defaulted on their mortgages and lost their homes. 
Many of those remaining lower-level employees who did retain their jobs in the banking 
industry were given pay cuts. At the top end, executive pay quickly rebounded and reached 
pre-crisis levels in most sectors, including banking; share prices also recovered to exceed 
their pre-2008 highs (Dorling, 2014). Thus, those with senior positions, who could afford to 
retain their shares, regained most if not all of their losses; those at the lower end who lost 
jobs, homes, and earning power over an extended period, will likely never recover in the 
same way (Stiglitz, 2013). Thus, the financial gap has been extended by changes at both ends 
of the spectrum. 
 
The institutionalization of new practices 
As the types of new practices and processes that we lay out above become repeated and 
gradually adopted across a field, there is a “typification of habitualized action” (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967: 54) that leads to practices gaining legitimacy and becoming 
institutionalized. There are several, mutually reinforcing, mechanisms through which this 
happens, and generally distinguishes between those actions that are repeated but not 
institutionalized, and those that are. First, those in positions of power usually feel that it is in 
their best interest to maintain the inequity and thus utilize their bases of power to ensure that 
systems are established to protect their position. Thus, some practices are encouraged and 
reinforced, while others are condemned and curtailed. While work on power in the 
establishment and development of institutionalized practices is relatively limited (Munir, 
2015; Willmott, 2015), Lawrence (2008; see also Lawrence & Buchanan, this volume) is 
among the few who has theorized how episodic and systemic forms of power are utilized to 
establish particular institutional practices. 
Second, while those in power can take decisions of the type we saw at HBOS that can create 
what become microfoundations of new institutionalized practices, institutions rely on the 
wider repetition of actions for their reproduction (Barley, this volume; Berger & Luckmann, 
1967; Powell & Rerup, this volume). Thus, it becomes apparent that institutionalization is 
dependent on the situated actions of those at all levels of society. Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006: 215) termed this, “institutional work – the purposive action of individuals and 
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organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions.” For example, Dacin, 
Munir and Tracey (2010: 1406) described how social class structures are perpetuated, at least 
in part, by ritualized formal dining practices at Cambridge University. These practices are 
maintained in part by the institutional work carried out by staff “performing a role akin to that 
of servants during England’s Victorian era.” A student in the study recalled an example of 
this: “At our first formal [dinner], a couple of people got up to go out and have a cigarette in 
between the courses and the sort of the head waiter came up to them and said loudly, ‘You 
are not peasants! Getting up and smoking in between meals is for peasants!’ That incident has 
just stuck in my mind.” Such repeated micro-activity helps to maintain a system of inequality 
that, in societal terms at least, often disadvantages those who are reinforcing it. As Willmott 
(2015) pointed out, even relatively mundane forms of oppression can become 
institutionalized in ordinary work situations. 
The role of day-to-day practices in organizations in maintaining particular courses of action 
leads to our third point that the ways in which organizations are structured can ensure that 
hierarchical divisions are reinforced and taken-for-granted. In this way, not only do 
organizational practices that promote inequality become reified through the establishment of 
ritual and repetition, but those who are disadvantaged often see no way to challenge the 
accepted orthodoxy and, as we see above, often actively participate in the practice 
reproduction. Gray and Kish-Gephart (2013) described the processes that lead to this as a 
particular form of institutional work that they term “class work.” Drawing on Goffman 
(1967), they define class work as the interpretive processes and interaction rituals that 
organization members individually and collectively engage in to conform to “class rules” and 
reinforce class distinctions. As they explain, “one’s social class and attendant behavior is not 
simply a function of one’s self-construed social class but is also constructed and reinforced 
(often unconsciously) through routines and practices that perpetuate inequality…. Class work 
constructs and legitimates organizational norms and routines as appropriate and expected 
behavior…. In this way, inequities become institutionalized and maintained over time” (Gray 
& Kish-Gephart, 2013: 672). A significant component of this reinforcement of unequal status 
comes from those who self-ascribe to a lower social class feeling threatened, and even 
stigmatized. According to Eitzen and Smith (2003), this in turn can lead to feelings of shame, 
humiliation, and self-blame for their position, and “a constant fear of never having ‘got it 
right’” (Skeggs, 1997: 6). In sum, many of those in the upper and lower classes see their 
positions as inevitable outcomes of inherent characteristics: the upper class have no desire to 
alter the status quo, the lower class lack the means to do so. This underpins Wilkinson and 
Pickett’s (2010) analysis of why inequality is so pernicious in its societal outcomes. 
While these mechanisms remain under-examined in the institutional literature, they are 
central to our understanding of how inequality becomes established in often seemingly 
mundane organizational practices. Equally important is how these practices spread from one 
organization, and field, to another. It is to this that we now turn. 
 
Disseminating practices of inequality 
Barley (2007), building on the arguments that he espoused over a decade earlier (Stern & 
Barley, 1996), contended that while we have attended to the ways in which society influences 
organizations, we have paid much less attention to how organizations enact the world around 
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them and shape society. Of course, this entire chapter explores this in one way or another, but 
it is an observation that is particularly apposite when we think about how particular 
institutional microfoundations serve as platforms for enacting new mechanisms for the 
production and perpetuation of inequality. As the financial crisis illustrated, individual 
actions can quickly spread across institutional fields, and from one field to another. For this 
to happen, as Zucker (1977: 728) explained, actions must be perceived as being objective and 
exterior. “Acts are objective when they are potentially repeatable by other actors without 
changing the common understanding of the act, while acts are exterior when the subjective 
understanding of acts is reconstructed as intersubjective.” A key component to this is the 
process of theorization whereby a particular practice is seen as being a legitimate solution to 
a particular organizational failing (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Strang & Meyer, 
1993). Thus, a decision at the Bank of Scotland to shift from being conservative guardians of 
people’s money to aggressive purveyors of a range of banking services is constructed as a 
rational act with moral and pragmatic legitimacy. This is because other banks confronted with 
similar circumstances are carrying out similar activities, and in so doing establishing 
perceived economies for their organizations and greater returns for shareholders. In this 
process, “the objectivity of institutional arrangements ‘hardens’ as individuals internalize 
these objective social realities, take them for granted and recreate them in their ongoing 
interactions” (Dolfsma & Verbürg, 2008: 1036). 
While earlier institutional accounts failed to problematize the diffusion of practices across a 
field, with their attendant micro-processes and issues of power and politics (Zilber, 2008), it 
has since been established that ideas are not passively transmitted from one organization to 
another. Rather, the concepts of theorization and translation (Czarniawska & Sevon, 1996; 
Zilber, 2006; Wedlin & Sahlin, this volume) established the idea that practices are adapted to 
suit local circumstances. In particular, practices established in one context are never fully 
understood, and thus the gaps in understanding lead to interpretations – translations – based 
on the meanings that are attributed to particular aspects of the practice and how they might fit 
in a different organizational context (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; 
Wedlin & Sahlin, this volume). Importantly, this process is intentional rather than accidental, 
and collective in that there is broad agreement or acceptance in how the practice is to be 
adopted (Gondo & Amis, 2013; Searle, 2005). Thus, new practices are not “imprinted 
literally” into organizations or professions by external parties, such as a government, 
regulator, or other dominant organization, but are rather interpreted and enacted by those 
within an organization (Dunn & Jones, 2010). For example, the adoption of more risky 
banking practices, while broadly accepted, was interpreted and enacted differently in 
different banks. Thus, some banks emphasized different products, or developed different loan 
application processes, but were still hit with common catastrophic effects (Martin, 2013; 
Perman, 2013). The acceptance of particular power structures, large CEO salaries, part-time 
contracts for lower-skilled workers, and sub-contracting of manufacturing to overseas 
factories, takes place at the field level where practices are theorized as viable solutions to 
common problems: local translation takes place within organizations to make the solution 
contextually-specific. As Powell and Colyvas (2008: 285) explained: 
micro-level consensus is generated through a process in which values and 
beliefs from the larger society are pulled down into local circumstances, 
creating differential expectations about the performance of individuals in task 
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groups. These expectations can become taken-for-granted features of 
organizations, and persist even if they are unjust or unproductive, thus giving 
them an ‘objective’ quality. 
However, as Meyer and Höllerer (2010) have pointed out, selection options are limited by the 
situation in which the action is to occur. Thus, for our purposes, actions that increase 
inequality have become in many cases seemingly inevitable outcomes derived from the 
perceived scarcity of “legitimate” policies of banks, large corporations, and governments. 
Those who rail for change – the ‘Occupy’ movements, living wage proponents, those who 
argue for wealth distribution from more progressive taxation regimes – find themselves 
marginalized: while they may attract sympathy from (some) decision makers, the actions they 
propose are usually seen as not viable in the construed value frameworks in which they 
would have to be implemented. In order to be seen as having utility, therefore, problems 
within the field normally need to be reframed in some way, as we saw, for example, with the 
Arab Spring; however, such reframing is exceptional. 
Our intent in this section has been to show the interplay between activities at the individual, 
organizational and field levels. While practices rules, norms, and values are transmitted 
through fields, they are initially constructed, and then subsequently translated, by individuals 
in organizations. It is at the organizational level that policies and actions that perpetuate 
inequality are enacted, often resulting in income levels becoming stratified (see, e.g., Cobb, 
2015), and wealth accumulating in a small proportion of the population (Chang, 2011; 
Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013). We have demonstrated the ways in which everyday activities 
can become reified, sometimes quite rapidly in the case of the banking industry, and how 
these can create an interlocking system of structures, systems, values, and norms of behavior 
in which increased inequality becomes an almost inevitable outcome. Aligned to these 
activities, of course, are the modes of language and other communicative practices that 
individuals use that help to coordinate social activities. We assess the influence of such 
discursive devices in the next section. 
 
Discourse and Inequality 
“In a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, characterise, and constitute the social body, 
and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor 
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation, and functioning 
of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain 
economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this 
association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we 
cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (Foucault, 1980: 
93-94). 
“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class 
which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so 
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that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental 
production are subject to it” (Marx & Engels, 1965: 61). 
Inequality is different from winning or losing in a race, although that is how it is often 
portrayed. Rather, inequality is a long-term condition, and its continued existence necessarily 
means domination of particular groups over others. Given the problematic nature of visible 
privilege or domination, which can lead to rebellion or resistance by the oppressed, it is not 
surprising that the continuation of inequality needs continuous legitimation. This is made 
possible by an interrelated system of discourses that collectively serve to justify a particular 
social order (Fairclough, 2010; Fallon, 2006; Van Djik, 1994). Indeed, over centuries, 
discourse has played a central role in ‘institutionalizing’ inequality. Previously, we 
mentioned the unprecedented concentration of wealth in the world and the fact that inequality 
has been increasing rapidly. Why have people not resisted it? How have they come to accept 
their inferior status? 
Our hierarchical societies are not maintained by brute force. Although physical force is often 
necessary in establishing a social structure, the everyday maintenance of the institutional 
order is carried out principally through the establishment of a belief system that bestows 
moral and pragmatic legitimacy upon it. In other words, those in inferior positions must 
somehow be made to accept their fate. Thus, surveys show that while American class 
mobility has diminished greatly over the years, especially in comparison to Western Europe, 
faith in the American Dream continues to exist. As Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) suggest, if 
one wants to live the American dream, one should move to Denmark or Finland. Still, 
discourses based on rags-to-riches stories of billionaires and celebrities, who through their 
vision or never-say-die attitude attain heights that are supposedly within the grasp of 
everyone if only they tried hard enough, go a long way towards sustaining and perpetuating 
this myth.  
The same discourses serve to legitimize the exponential growth in CEO salaries reported at 
the opening of the chapter. The myth of meritocracy, springing once again from a willingness 
to work hard, intelligence, and the courage to take risks, provides crucial support to our 
acceptance of stark inequality in income. Similarly, gender inequality manifest in differing 
pay for men and women is able to continue because we believe that men are clearly able to do 
things women cannot, and that if the ‘value-neutral’ institution of the market pays men more, 
they must deserve it. Before we describe how the production and dominance of various 
discourses has been instrumental in the creation and perpetuation of inequality, we briefly 
examine the rise in attention paid to discourse analysis within institutional theory.  
 
 
Institutionalism and Discourse 
With discourse central to the creation and persistence of particular social orders, the use of 
discourse analysis has increased among institutional theorists (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 
2004; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Phillips & Oswick, 2012; Phillips & 
Nam, this volume). This is of course unsurprising given that the roots of institutionalism lie 
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in social constructivism (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), a perspective that privileges discourses 
as building blocks of social life and suggests that perhaps the best method to deconstruct 
institutional formation is discourse analysis. In fact, Phillips et al. (2004) claim that 
institutions are constructed primarily through the production of texts. Texts include written 
documents, speech acts, pictures, and symbols (Grant, Keenoy & Oswick, 1998; Taylor & 
Van Every, 2000) and combine symbolic and material elements. 
For example, the institutional process of theorization, referred to in the previous section, 
could be seen as a process in which texts are produced that collectively form discourses 
which in turn render particular institutional arrangements sensible, meaningful, and 
legitimate. The HBOS example above provides a good example of this as the new approach 
to creating, promoting, and selling financial products was imbricated in an array of electronic, 
printed, audio, and video materials that were circulated to staff and customers. Similarly, in 
their study of popular photography, Munir and Phillips (2005) described how institutional 
entrepreneurship was in fact a discursive process rooted in the production of texts, which 
constituted new objects, concepts and subject positions that changed the dynamics of the 
institutional field. More recently, Khaire and Wadhwani (2010) used organizational discourse 
analysis to investigate the production of a new category in the global market for art. 
Discourse analysis thus provides an epistemological foundation and a methodological 
approach for exploring the processes of social construction that privilege certain discourses 
and social groups over others, thereby continuously legitimizing particular institutionalized 
practices. We now briefly describe how various discourses are produced and go on to 
examine their role in institutionalizing inequality.  
  
Discursive Legitimization of Inequality 
As mentioned above, sustained domination requires continuous legitimation for which the 
production and acceptance of texts is essential. An interesting example is that of British rule 
in India, which was underpinned by discourses that privileged everything that the colonial 
masters stood for and convinced the natives of their inferiority (Said, 1978). One example of 
such a text is the English Education Act of 1835. The Act took away support from indigenous 
curricula and educational institutions and reallocated it to Western curriculum, with English 
as the medium of instruction. As Cutts (1953) has pointed out, this Act was the result of long 
discussions, which are most famous for the memorandum produced by Thomas Macaulay, a 
historian and high ranking member of the British government, in February 1835. The 
memorandum, known as Macaulay’s Minute, laid the basis for an educational policy whose 
effects can be seen even today. Cutts (1953) reported that, in his Minute, Macaulay stated, “I 
have conversed both here and at home with men distinguished by their proficiency in the 
Eastern tongues. .... I have never found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of 
a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” 
Macaulay argued that the need of the hour was to produce in India, “a class of persons, Indian 
in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.” Such 
arguments were decisive in the adoption of this policy in India and in completely 
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transforming the educational system of the vast country to one that affirmed Western 
supremacy and established the useless nature of locally produced knowledge.  
The dismantling of the traditional schooling system and the privileged position of the English 
language and Western knowledge provided the bedrock on which a new stratification of India 
took place, helping to ensure continuous deference by Indians to their western rulers. The 
durability of such structures depends on the success with which imperialist discourses are 
diffused and internalized (Bhabha, 2004; Said, 1978). The effect of such discourses is to 
sustain a “regime of truth” such that a particular “object of discours”, or social objectivity, is 
effectively institutionalized (Foucault, 1977).  
Religious discourses have also played a significant role in justifying sustained inequalities 
and the legitimization of particular social orders (Berger 1967). While various religious 
movements have, over the years, undoubtedly led to more egalitarian social orders, they have 
also been used to legitimize highly unequal relations and institutions by “bestowing upon 
them an ultimately valid ontological status, that is, by locating them within a sacred and 
cosmic frame of reference” (Berger 1967: 33). 
To take another example from India, a religious stratification was juxtaposed on society 
pinning down each individual’s place in the social order depending on their social category, 
or caste. Conveniently, this social stratification placed the powerful on top, and precluded the 
weak from ever rising to the higher castes. Moreover, the concept of karma justified one’s 
plight in terms of deeds in a past life. Good karma could only be accumulated through 
obedience and acceptance of the existing social order. This process is not confined to India of 
course. A similar process took place in the West where, when Catholicism was seen to 
provide inadequate justification for capitalism, Protestantism, much friendlier towards private 
property and the social divides that markets created, was ushered in (Wisman & Smith, 
2011). Such forms of analysis have been taken on by Mair, Wolf and Seelos (2015) who 
highlight the importance of religious texts in explaining the difficulty in overcoming deeply 
entrenched social practices such as open defecation that reify patterns of inequality in rural 
India. 
We can also trace the role of discourse in the perpetuation of racial and gender-based 
inequality. The legacy left behind by the institution of slavery and historical power relations 
between racial groups, racial inequality, is pervasive and persistent in the United States. 
Compared to whites, African Americans have significantly lower incomes and less wealth, 
have higher mortality and incarceration rates and lower educational attainment, and 
experience poorer health (Bobo & Smith, 1998). For a long time, this inequality was justified 
by dominant scientific and other discourses that suggested that African Americans were 
somehow biologically inferior. Thanks to the Civil Rights movement in America and other 
struggles, explicit racism has become illegal. Few, other than far right extremists, admit to 
being racist in public. However, while greatly diminished, the practice of racism continues, 
with many whites still preferring to maintain social distance from African Americans – 
though they would not admit it is because of racism. While overtly racist discourses have 
now been marginalized, other essentialist and culturally deterministic ones have taken their 
place arguing that much of these individuals’ social and economic condition is not due to race 
but simply because of lack of hard work or attitude problems. For many, affirmative action is 
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seen to only exacerbate this laziness and dependence (Bobo & Smith, 1998). As van Dijk 
(1992) shows, reporting in the media often reinforces such beliefs, constructing and then 
playing to stereotypes. 
Research on gender shows similar patterns. Several scholars have shown organizations to be 
profoundly gendered places to work (Acker, 1990; Gherardi, 1995). Calás and Smircich 
(1993), for example, explain how the management literature constructs a masculine image of 
the leader. Ogbor (2000) and Ahl (2006) show how entrepreneurship discourse is similarly 
gendered. The gendering of the workplace continues at least partially due to the texts that 
describe the workplace and women’s role in it. In most of these, women are represented as 
the only gendered subjects, disturbing the smooth running of otherwise gender-free 
organisations, a problem to be fixed (Calás & Smircich, 1993). Similarly, the debate is 
confined to the capitalist paradigm in which a firm must function in particular ways, and our 
job is simply to make it possible for women to play the roles that are available. Sheryl 
Sandberg’s bestselling Lean In (2013) is a case in point. Sandberg’s feminism essentially 
rests on the notion that if women get the same rights as men, the problem is solved. She does 
not see that the gender ‘problem’ is inextricably linked with other issues such as capitalism 
which create certain corporate dynamics and organizational forms, and even if privileged 
white men choose to share the benefits of corporate capitalism with privileged white women 
who ‘lean in’, the systemic inequality does not go away (see also Dobbin & Kaley, this 
volume). 
These discourses matter because they are instrumental in constructing reality (Fairclough, 
1992). Management texts, popular books, media reports, and television programs, all shape 
perceptions of reality (Calás & Smircich, 1993; Hardy, Palmer & Phillips, 2000; Phillips & 
Hardy, 1997) and the gendered language, concepts, and tropes that are used (e.g., from 
competitive sports) act as powerful transmitters of meaning about how an ideal workplace 
should function and who is appropriate for a job. 
 
The Discourse of Markets and Inequality 
Perhaps the most powerful discourse justifying inequality now is that of the supremacy of 
markets. As we have seen above, even institutionalized practices of gender or race-based 
discrimination are increasingly supported by resorting to the fundamental ‘truth’ of the 
market. Gray (2001) similarly suggests that the types of religious doctrines that were 
pervasive more than a hundred years ago have now been replaced for many people by those 
of a more ‘scientific’ persuasion – neoclassical economics. This notion served to entrench the 
myth of ‘free’ markets and justified the consequent concentration of wealth. The wealth 
accumulated by the elites was seen to be legitimately acquired and fundamental to the 
progress of the entire society. Indeed, so powerful was the discourse that promoted a 
neoliberal agenda that any country, or individual, who professed anything other than a belief 
in the primacy of free markets was derided and marginalized (Chang, 2011). Discourses 
portraying the elite as superior in ability and fortitude and as producers of livelihoods for the 
less fortunate members of society were similarly created.  
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Inequality is justified by this discourse as being essential to motivating investments in human 
and material capital, rewarding effort, and to getting talented individuals to fully use their 
abilities. Thus, in a recent issue of The Economist, a magazine known for articulating free 
market arguments, raising the minimum wage was presented as a dangerous thing to do for it 
might end in job losses for the very workers that it purported to help. The argument goes back 
to the productivity incentives logic enshrined in neoclassical economics discourse.  
A similarly dominant discourse that informs our understanding of corporate governance is 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
This discourse developed not only to explain the longevity of corporations despite the self-
interested proclivities of managers, but also to justify it. This has led to sustained 
redistribution of profits to shareholders and corporate managers leading to concentration of 
wealth not only across organizations but also across geographical locations. The pressure that 
this system exerts has also led to the erosion of labor laws that circumscribed minimum 
employment conditions, and marked increases in inequality (Chang, 2011).  
Corporate devices to further entrench top management and enrich shareholders, often at the 
expense of other stakeholders, have been institutionalized by new discourses. For example, 
Hirsch’s (1986) landmark study of golden parachutes and ambushes showed convincingly 
how discursive strategies aimed at glamourizing financial instruments and portraying firms as 
assets contributed to a transformation of practices on Wall Street (see also Collins, 2007). 
The enrichment of CEOs and shareholders over workers is further sustained by discourses of 
meritocracy and exceptionalism which provide justifications for the elite’s position at the top. 
Over the past three decades, discourses celebrating successful CEOs have led to the 
legitimization of their pay, which according to some, has now reached ‘Marie Antoinette 
proportions’ (Lublin, 1996).  
An important manifestation of the centrality of language to such issues is seen in the debate 
on welfare. From an ideal, a social contract and an aspiration in the 1960s, by the 1990s, the 
term ‘welfare’ had become associated with one of the most unpopular social programs in 
America (Jacoby 1994), with welfare recipients one of the least respected groups (Fiske, Xu, 
Cuddy, & Glick 1999). This transformation was underpinned by discourses that categorized 
the poor as undeserving (Katz 1993; Piven & Cloward 1993). 
The powerful free market discourse is so pervasive that it is constantly evoked in discussions 
of gender or race based inequality too. Serbian tennis champion Novak Djokovic’s remarks 
about women tennis players’ lower wages being a fair reflection of their market demand is a 
good illustration of the intersection of gender and market discourses (‘Novak Djokovic’, 
2016). Djokovic suggested that men should get paid more because men’s television ratings 
are higher than women’s. In other words, whoever is able to attract more coverage should get 
paid more. What he overlooked was that other factors are often at work other than popularity. 
The U.S. women’s soccer team’s World Cup victory against Japan in 2015 was the most-
watched soccer match in American history. Yet on average, American women soccer players 
earn far less than the male players. The salary cap in the National Women’s Soccer League is 
$265,000, over 13 times less than the cap in men’s Major League Soccer.  
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Thanks to powerful, deeply entrenched discourses that color reality, empirical evidence and 
impressions are often at odds, be it CEO salaries, proportion of women on boards, or the 
proportion of white males in executive positions. If inequality is to be challenged the 
discourses underpinning these social orders and their taken-for-grantedness need to be 
dismantled.  
Understanding how power operates and how discourses assume hegemony is a challenge for 
institutional theorists. While power is always implicit in these analyses, with institutional 
entrepreneurs producing and leveraging discourses to achieve their ends (Hirsch, 1986; Munir 
& Phillips, 2005) the lack of explicit attention to power constitutes a noteworthy lacuna (see 
Lawrence, 2008, for a review). As Willmott (2015) suggested, power may occasionally be 
invoked as a relevant focus or concept of analysis (e.g., Lawrence & Buchanan, this volume; 
Zald & Lounsbury 2010), but its operation and significance is disassociated from structures 
of domination and oppression. Understanding how discourses perpetuate social inequality 
provides fertile ground for understanding the location and operation of power in an 
institutional setting and is a subject to which institutional theorists can thus make an 
important contribution. 
 
Institutional Logics and Inequality 
“new instruments are needed to regain control over a financial capitalism that 
has run amok” (Piketty, 2014: 474). 
“To what extent do we wish to make ours a market-centered world?” (Burgin, 
2012: 226) 
The dominant theme in institutional theory in recent years has been the turn to institutional 
logics. An institutional logic refers to “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions 
– which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to organizations and 
individuals to elaborate” (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 248). As Friedland and Alford (1991) 
explained, and Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012; see also Thornton, 2004) later 
elaborated, each society contains an interinstitutional system that is composed of several 
institutional orders – family, community, religion, state, market, profession, and corporation2 
– that vary in scope and prominence across societies. Central to these orders are institutional 
logics. “These logics are symbolically grounded, organizationally structured, politically 
defended, and technically and materially constrained, and hence have specific historical 
limits” (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 249). A logics perspective recognizes that institutions 
cannot be analyzed in isolation from each other but rather that they must be understood in 
their mutually interdependent relationships, even if this implies dealing with contradiction 
and conflict. Extending neo-institutional theorizing (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977) that emphasized structure over agency, the institutional logics 
perspective seeks to understand how institutions both constrain and enable action. More 
recently, this has been used to show how the socially constructed patterns of cultural 
symbols, beliefs and values shape the dynamics, actions and decision outcomes in 
																																								 																					2	From Thornton et al. (2012). 
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organizations and across organizational fields (Lounsbury, 2007; Ocasio, Thornton & 
Lounsbury, this volume).  
While, as a theoretical perspective, the turn to logics has generated significant insights on a 
range of social phenomena, as with other streams within institutional theory it has hardly 
been used to engage with some of the major social issues of our time, including the financial 
crisis, exploitation of workers, corporate power, and inequality (e.g., Munir, 2012, 2015; 
Willmott, 2015). In this section, we explain why and how institutional logics can offer a 
potentially revelatory route to uncovering why systems of inequality have become entrenched 
in our society, and in so doing offer useful avenues that interested scholars might profitably 
pursue. 
Martí and Mair (2009: 100) argued that, “poverty is multidimensional and its causes are 
rooted in a set of practices, rules, and technologies institutionalized in a determinate context.” 
We suggest that the same is true of inequality. Primarily, this is because logics shape what 
issues are considered problematic, what should be attended to, and thus what should be 
considered during decision-making (Thornton et al., 2012). Recent work on institutional 
logics has pointed to the ways in which institutional fields are subject not to simple struggles 
whereby proponents of one logic are pitted against those of another until one group is able to 
assert its dominance. Rather, decision-makers in social settings are subject to more complex 
arrangements of logic “constellations” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) in which multiple sets of 
values, beliefs and assumptions assume influence from different parts of, and beyond, the 
field. This has reaffirmed a characteristic of “old” institutionalism that emphasized the plural 
nature of institutions (e.g., Kraatz & Block, 2008; Selznick, 1949), something that was often 
lost as attempts focused on the exposition of a struggle for dominance among competing 
logics. Kraatz and Block (2008) developed the idea of institutional pluralism (see also Kraatz 
& Block, this volume), a theoretical understanding that was elaborated by Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and Lounsbury (2011), who contended that the degree of 
“institutional complexity” in a particular field is dependent upon the number of salient logics 
and their degree of incompatibility. This point was taken up by Uzo and Mair (2014) who 
found that organizations in institutionally complex settings, including developing countries 
such as Nigeria, are often born at the interstices of formal and informal institutions. In these 
settings, organizational life and outcomes are critically shaped by the incongruence between 
“what the law prescribes as legal and what informal systems of beliefs foresee as socially 
acceptable” (Uzo & Mair, 2014: 57). The impact of this institutional pluralism becomes 
apparent when we consider the working conditions in many developing countries that results 
in factory owners and senior brand managers garnering large sums while those doing the 
physical work frequently operate in dangerous conditions for low rates of pay (e.g., 
Chamberlain, 2012; Chan, 2013; Khan et al., 2007; Pattisson, 2015). 
Recent work suggests that while societies in many parts of the world are characterized by a 
constellation of competing logics, the dominant logic is often an extreme form of capitalism 
that values the maximization of self-interest and accompanying wealth accumulation above 
anything else. Piketty’s (2014) treatise Capital, Danny Dorling’s (2011, 2014) critiques of a 
society that permits the wealthiest 1% to continue to accumulate wealth at an increasing rate, 
and other similar pieces (e.g., Chang, 2011; Lansley, 2012; Stiglitz, 2013) make a compelling 
case for this. Indeed, the change in practices at HBOS were reflective of a dominant 
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institutional logic in which the maximization of profits, rather than more conservative accrual 
of capital, became taken-for-granted. It also clearly demonstrates the reciprocal interaction 
between microprocesses and field-level logics. While we certainly acknowledge that the case 
for the dominance of such a market logic is undeniable, we contend that an examination of 
the institutional dynamics that have produced such an outcome provides useful insights for 
theorists and policy-makers alike. As Munir (2011) suggests, institutional theorists could add 
great value by exploring how logics shifted from one that placed markets within society to 
one that understands society in terms of markets.  
Society has not always been dominated by a market logic (Biggart & Castanias, 2001). Pre-
capitalist economic thought in the West was deeply influenced by a strong sense of the social 
and even the religious. Prices did not only have to be ‘right’ but also ‘just’ and the economy 
was often envisioned as a moral order. Even when later liberal thought, exemplified in the 
writings of David Hume and Adam Smith, went about creating a new moral order from the 
perspective of the public rather than the monarch, institutional relations still had to be 
‘correct’ in terms of morality. Further, as Chang (2011) contends, if we look historically, 
those countries that currently are biggest proponents for free market systems, such as the 
USA and UK, benefitted from strongly protectionist regimes that they now tout as anathema 
to modern economies. How we moved from systems predicated on government intervention 
to an institutional order where it has become accepted that whatever social order results from 
market forces is ‘just’ (see Burgin, 2012, for an historical exposition of this) is thus an 
extremely important and significant challenge for institutional theorists.  
Despite our point about the apparent predominance of the market logic, it is certainly not 
some form of monolithic hegemony. Even countries that emphasize free market economies, 
such as the USA, Sweden, Germany, Japan or South Korea, have variations in the degree and 
location of government intervention. Further, there are of course conflicting logics enacted in 
countries with different ideological regimes – for example, China, Russia, Cuba, North 
Korea, Greece, Iran and Saudia Arabia. The rise of Jeremy Corbyn in the UK and Bernie 
Sanders in the USA as populist socialist figureheads also points to the problematizing of 
market logics. There was also, of course, a questioning of market logics in the aftermath of 
the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, even if it has not immediately resulted in any large-
scale ideological shifts in government philosophies in most major economies around the 
world. 
Again, it is important to understand the complexity of institutional logics when it comes to 
understanding the persistence of inequality and the (in)effectiveness of measures designed to 
address it. For example, Martí and Mair (2009: 112) described how attempts to engage 
women in rural Bangladesh in commercial activities involved not only, 
“juggling financial and business logics…. it also requires the entrepreneurial actor 
to navigate subtly between a range of other logics since the provision of loans for 
productive purposes challenges existing cultural and religious norms that sanction 
the seclusion of these women in their houses, the patriarchal system, or the 
gendered division of labor that restricts the involvement of women to a very 
limited range of public activities.” 
Building on this line of thought, Venkataraman et al. (2016) showed how logics can be 
deployed as strategic resources to alter institutional arrangements that underpin deeply 
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entrenched inequality. Studying a development project targeting women in rural India, they 
showed how the simultaneous enactment of both community and market logics was critical in 
the development of new social structures – Self-Help Groups – to break existing patterns of 
dominance and economic exclusion. Thus, while we can see the prominence of a market 
logic, we also need to account for the ways in which constellations of logics interact in 
messy, often unanticipated ways. 
There are, of course, other situations in which conflicting logics should draw attention from 
institutional theorists. For example, in the field of Islamic Banking, while practices may vary, 
the system is premised on fairness rather than simply an efficiency of capital. Work must be 
done to accrue profits: simply lending money to someone who needs it does not count as 
work as, under the Islamic banking logic, money must not be allowed to simply create more 
money. Thus, instead of traditional accounts with set interest rates, Islamic banks offer 
accounts in which the bank uses deposits to purchase assets that in turn can generate profits 
or losses. Similarly, market speculation is disallowed. Islamic finance prohibits the selling of 
something one does not own, since that introduces the risk of its unavailability later on. 
Finally, Islamic finance requires that investments are restricted to ethical causes or projects. 
Anything unethical or socially irresponsible, from weapons to gambling to adult 
entertainment, is considered inappropriate for investment. The continued presence of such 
principles in societies dominated by a market logic raises questions such as how and why 
traditional logics based on fairness and principles of justice are resisted and suppressed.  
Below, we discuss two mutually constitutive societal characteristics that have resulted in the 
current dominance of the market logic. The first is the development of values and norms that 
have rendered capital accumulation not only legitimate but unquestionably appropriate for a 
functioning member of society. The second is the creation of policies and laws that render 
any other form of functioning appear irrational and difficult to comprehend. We take each of 
these in turn. 
 
Inequality, Logics and Society 
Barley (2008, see also this volume) provides compelling encouragement for institutionalists 
to “study social organization in action.” Drawing in particular on the Chicago School 
sociology of Everett Hughes, Barley argued that, “institutions are tied to ideologies 
championed by specific segments of society that lend the institution legitimacy. As ideologies 
change, legitimacy will change and, hence, so will the institution” (2008: 497). Scott et al. 
(2000) similarly argued that changes in institutional logics are accompanied by changes in the 
structures of field governance. It is our contention that such societal changes in what 
constitutes legitimate courses of action, has led, over time, to an increase in levels of 
inequality. For example, as has been widely reported, many if not most developed economies 
have been characterized by a shift from, among other things, a strong manufacturing base to a 
reliance on service sector jobs. One outcome of this has been, drawing on Barley, a new 
societal ideology with an accepted bifurcation. Leana et al. (2012: 888), building on Craypo 
and Cormier (2000), similarly argued that, as a consequence, “many firms are structured like 
an hourglass, characterized by large wage disparities. At the top is a set of highly skilled 
professionals (e.g., doctors, chefs), and at the bottom is a far larger group of frontline support 
staff with fewer qualifications (e.g., nurse aides, waiters) and nowhere to move up.” This has 
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created an accepted reality in which “poverty, like culture, provides a context with systematic 
and persistent influences that are substantial to the individuals living in it” (Leana et al., 
2012: 891). This points to the revived interest in cultural perspectives of inequality (see, for 
example, Cohen, 2010; Small, Marding & Lamont, 2010). This increasingly polarized 
societal structure is sustained and perpetuated by a shared understanding and acceptance of 
inequality based on a set of widely held beliefs, material practices and symbolic 
constructions. The pervasiveness of inequality is reinforced by a strong emphasis on the role 
of professions and professional workers in our society. This runs across the financial 
industries, including banks, financial traders, accounting firms, and so on, with an emphasis 
on the maximization of financial returns for clients, shareholders and senior employees. 
Stinchcombe (1997: 8) argued that the influence of institutions stems from the fact that they 
“embody a value that the people also accept.” Lok (2010) goes further, stating that 
institutional logics not only direct what individuals want or how they should act, but indeed 
who or what they are. In this respect, the pervasiveness of logics becomes apparent. 
Importantly, while we have argued that there is often a dominant market logic, we must be 
attuned to the fact that inequality creates, and rests upon, different lived experiences, and 
different corresponding logics that are experienced in multiple ways. Thus, inequality will 
condition understanding and action in particular ways that are nonsensical to those from 
different socio-economic strata. For example, according to Gray and Kish-Gephart (2013: 
678), 
“Members of upper social classes adopt a privileged subject position that allows 
them to assume that, as successful people, they possess ‘the right stuff’ and 
deserve more than others. To hold this view they must develop a rationale that 
justifiably differentiates them from others.” 
As Dorling (2014) and other social commentators, such as The Guardian’s Polly Toynbee, 
have described, this allows those in positions of advantage to pursue courses of action that 
reinforce and extend that advantage, irrespective of the outcomes on others be they Nepalese 
construction workers in Qatar (Gibson, 2014), factory workers manufacturing Apple products 
in China (Agence France-Presse, 2014; Chan, 2013) or the working poor in the UK (Butler, 
2015). In this respect, outcomes are not only the result of one group being more powerful 
than another and thus able to exert its will, but also of socially constructed and broadly 
accepted meanings that are attached to groups and actions. This, in turn, accounts for 
opportunity “hoard and exclusion” practices that result in enduring patterns of inequality 
(Tilly, 1998). Thus, those in different societal positions will operate according to different 
institutional logics. That said, those in some groups will not be unaware of the logics that 
govern others. Indeed, the litany of social ills that have been correlated with inequality stem 
from the realization among those who have little that others adhere to a different set of rules 
and values (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). 
Given that institutional logics are social constructions that place a heavy emphasis on broadly 
understood meanings (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Zilber, this volume), and that the degree to 
which these meanings are accepted determines their level of institutionalization, we can see 
that established understandings of what is appropriate – including assumptions that inequality 
is inevitable and that people are wealthy or poor as of right – have an extreme durability. 
Mutually understood schemas, frames, and rules structure the sensemaking of individuals: 
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“the shared nature of these cognitive frames makes it difficult to stray far from them in either 
thought or deed” (Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007: 959). 
 
Logics and Policy-Making 
In addition to the centrality of institutional logics in our understandings of inequality being 
located within, and a product of, societal norms and expectations, logics also come to be 
embodied in prevailing political and legal structures. These can be at the macro governmental 
level or those that attend to more micro, situation-specific contextual imperatives. Not only 
do they exert a prescriptive effect on what is and is not legally acceptable (cf. Scott’s (1995) 
regulative pillar), they also have a powerful symbolic impact on conveying what is legitimate 
in a particular societal setting. In this respect, as institutional scholars have explained, we can 
see mutually constitutive effects across levels, from the individual to the organizational to the 
field. 
For example, as we have noted earlier, the predominance of the market logic can be attributed 
to the rise of Thatcherism in the UK and Reaganomics in the US (see, among others, Lansley, 
2012; Levy & Temin, 2007; Stiglitz, 2013; Thompson, 2007). Accompanied by the withering 
away of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall, a political ideology took root in the 
West that favored free-market principles above all else. This led to a number of policies that 
reduced government intervention in corporate activities, and brought in “private sector 
discipline” to what were viewed as profligate public sector agencies. While the effects of 
these were manifold, one particularly important outcome was the so-called big bang in the 
UK in 1986 that allowed much greater operative freedom to financial institutions. Similar 
shifts in the financial services industry also occurred in the US in particular with the repeal of 
the Glass-Stegall Act in 1999 that had separated commercial and investment banking.  
Economic and social theorists have traced the relaxing of these regulative structures to the 
beginning of an increase in inequality (Chang, 2011; Dorling, 2011; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 
2013). To this point, the disparities of the early years of the twentieth century had been 
successively overcome by forced redistribution of wealth and controls on top wage earners, 
primarily through taxation. This had seen levels of inequality decrease throughout the 
twentieth century. However, from 1980 on, the Republicans in the US and the Conservatives 
in the UK began a policy shift that reflected the prevailing institutional logics. These changes 
led directly to the rapid increase in salaries in the financial sector that, it has been contended, 
have increased levels of inequality (e.g., Dorling, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013). While perhaps most 
obvious in their effect in the US and UK, the trend in other wealthy countries, such as Japan, 
Germany, France, and other continental European states, “is in the same direction” (Piketty, 
2014). This was certainly not a one-way street – government policies in the early 1980s 
reflected large swathes of public sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic – as such, we can see 
policies as carriers of logics in that they reinforced a particular ideology. 
While we can document the ways in which macro-level policies are carriers of logics, there 
are more localized effects that can also be powerful in their impact. For example, Barley 
(2007: 203) described how a decision by Chief Justice Waite in the 1886 Supreme Court 
hearing of an initially local property dispute in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad Co. led to corporations being “protected as if they were natural persons under the 
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law…and has been subsequently used by U.S. Courts to decide cases and grant corporations 
additional rights.” By becoming ensconced in law, Barley argues that corporate protectionism 
has worked to the benefit of shareholders and owners, but is against the public good. Chang 
(2011) similarly points to how the prioritization of shareholders in various pieces of 
legislation over the last thirty years has exacerbated inequality. In contrast to shareholders, 
who are generally able to move their capital to maximum advantage relatively easily, other 
stakeholders such as employees and some suppliers, are much more vulnerable to downturns 
in corporate performance. As we pointed out with the HBOS example, shareholders and 
senior managers have generally recovered their losses caused by the financial crisis, but those 
who have lost jobs, lost homes, or been otherwise negatively impacted, will likely never be 
able to fully recover. Thus, the shift in logics, described by Barley (2007) and documented in 
detail by Burgin (2012), from a protection of the individual worker to a prioritization of 
shareholder interests, has increased levels of inequality. 
Munir (2011: 116) similarly provides an example of how seemingly small policy shifts, such 
as the creation in 1991 by Goldman Sachs of a food commodity index and subsequent 
deregulation of futures markets, can have large effects on inequality. As he explained, 
“investors flocked toward the index, which led first to a gradual increase in food prices and 
then a rapid escalation. Riots broke out across numerous countries and the number of ‘food 
insecure’ crossed a billion.” Again, we see the effects of an evolution in logics as other banks 
created their own indices, trading increased, and US government policy changed, such as 
dropping the restriction that futures trading in wheat should only be allowed by bona fide 
hedgers and increasing the number of contracts that could be held. 
In sum, therefore, we see how changes in institutional logics over time have reflected 
increasing levels of inequality. As yet, however, we have not had sustained investigation by 
institutional theorists of how different logics emerge over time, why market logics have 
proved so resilient, and what the long-term effects of these have been for levels of inequality 
across different countries. 
 
Identity and Inequality 
“The oppressed will believe the worst about themselves” (Fanon, 1963). 
“It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social 
existence that determines their consciousness” (Marx, 1859). 
Identity has emerged as a central concept in the social sciences (Anderson, 1991; Butler, 
1990; Gilroy 1997; Glynn, this volume). Very simply, it allows us to make sense of who is 
who and adapt our behavior accordingly. This is not to suggest that identities are static and 
fixed in place, or even something we can possess. As Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argued, it is 
only in our social relations that we acquire 'subject positions' and such subjective identities 
are multifaceted. Thus, the same woman might be a soldier, an ethnic immigrant, a Muslim, a 
mother and a wife. Likewise, a man and a woman might share the same identity in one 
context (e.g., members of the American elite) but might end up with different ones (man and 
woman) upon travelling to Saudi Arabia. Therefore, no identity is inherently privileged and 
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the salience of particular identities depends on the social context and the existence of 
discursive practices that make such identities subjectively accessible. 
Similarly, identity is malleable rather than fixed in time or space. It is thus an ongoing 
project. Among many other things, the construction of a particular identity might draw upon 
actions (e.g., consumerism), biology (skin color), inheritance (wealth or class), or 
membership of a particular category (the communist party). As Gray and Kish-Gephart 
(2013) suggest, all these identities can play important roles in the structuring of social and 
organizational life. For example, who we hire, who rises through the ranks, who talks to who, 
and so on, all have much to do with identity. It is not surprising then that in organization 
studies, identity has also come to assume an increasingly important position as an interpretive 
frame in the analysis of organizations (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Glynn, this volume; Haslam 
& Reicher, 2006). As Alvesson, Ashcraft and Thomas (2008) suggested, “identity research 
has already yielded insight on questions of motivation, individual and group behaviour, 
communication patterns, leadership and managerial work, organizational change, corporate 
image, inter-organizational interaction, dynamics of control and resistance, and relations of 
gender and race-ethnicity” (Alvesson et al., 2008). Even economists have found identity, 
especially stigmatized identity, to affect performance in organizations (Akerlof & Kranton, 
2005, 2010; Hoff & Pandey, 2006). 
 
Identity and the Maintenance of Inequality 
While organization and institutional theorists have found identity to be a powerful construct, 
and even recognized how it is implicated in organizational dynamics (Gray and Kish-
Gephardt, 2013) an aspect of identity that has been little explored in organization studies is its 
role as a key mechanism through which inequalities are sustained. Wider literature in 
sociology and history has linked identity to unequal social structures – mainly through 
discursive, symbolic and performative methods, and it is important that institutional theorists 
recognize this dynamic.  
The implication of identity in the perpetuation of inequality begins right from childhood. 
Lareau’s (2011) seminal work shows how middle-class and working-class families raise their 
children completely differently, with the former cultivating attributes in children that will 
later help them get ahead in economic and social life, and the latter viewing a child’s natural 
growth as an accomplishment in itself. Similarly, Aries and Seider (2005) demonstrated how 
social class plays an important role both as an independent variable that shapes the formation 
of identity and as a domain of identity exploration. Their study of college students reveals 
how pupils carry different identities depending on their socio-economic class. Similarly, in a 
study of 5th–12th graders from US school districts in an economically depressed area Alix 
and Lantz (1973) found high occupational aspirations varied positively with socioeconomic 
status. Other studies confirm these findings. Whereas economically advantaged boys 
disproportionately expect to be doctors or lawyers, those from lower socioeconomic groups 
more expect to be policemen or firemen (Cook et al., 1995: 3375).  
Particularly interesting here is the work of Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) who showed how 
the lower academic performance of working class children is explained not by lower ability 
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but by institutional biases against them resulting in a situation where the class in which one is 
born ends up determining one’s probability of success in life. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) 
suggested that schools evaluate all children on the basis of their cultural capital (familiarity 
with high-brow culture of the dominant class) and penalize lower-class students who lack 
familiarity with it. Schools value extensive vocabularies, wide-reading, knowledge of music 
and art, and general etiquette. Almost always, students from higher social backgrounds 
acquire these resources at home while working class children have little access to them. 
Given the proliferation of texts that attribute success and failure to hard work and other 
personal qualities, lower class children end up blaming themselves for their failure which in 
turn leads to low performance and confidence wherever they go next. This is what Sennett 
and Cobb (1972) call the “hidden injuries of class”, in other words, the low self-esteem that 
plagues working class identity.  
Through ‘symbolic violence’ the dominant classes create meaning, control resources, enjoy 
privilege and status, and successfully hide the power relations that are the basis of its force 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Once the lower classes internalize the hierarchy of ‘taste’ 
(Bourdieu, 1984), it becomes relatively easy for the upper class to maintain their privileges 
(Lamont & Molnár, 2002). Despite shared membership of a particular category (Tajfel 1981) 
this dynamic prevents the lower class from seeing systemic oppression and thus from 
rebelling against this hierarchy in which they are consigned to the bottom. It is encouraging 
that some organizational theorists (e.g., Gray & Kish-Gephardt, 2013) are beginning to pay 
attention to class dynamics in the workplace but the role of social class in the production of 
different identities is still underexplored. As Aries and Seider (2005) point out, even in 
sociological literature when class is invoked it is generally done in material terms. More work 
needs to be done on the lived experience of class in organizations. In particular, discussions 
of inequality need to be enriched with insights into how social class position constrains 
decision-making (Aries & Seider, 2005).  
While class is important in understanding the links between institutional identities and 
inequality, distinctions based on gender identities are also produced and sustained through 
discourse, language, symbolism, and social performance (see Dobbin & Kaley, this volume). 
Once formed, such identities severely constrain human behavior, limiting spheres of 
prescribed action and expectation in organizations. Such distinctions are in turn maintained 
and reinforced by existing inequalities. Thus, as Ely (1995) pointed out, an 
overrepresentation of white men in high status positions not only reinforces the devaluation 
of women and non-white subordinates but is also found to be detrimental to performance 
outcomes of and treatment of women and ethnic minorities. Ely also found that compared to 
women in more gender-balanced firms, women in male-dominated firms tended to evaluate 
women’s attributes less favorably in relation to firm requirements for success. Thus, the 
construction of gender identities does not stop after one is socialized in families, schools and 
through media and culture, but continues in work organizations. As Ely’s research shows, 
proportional representation of women in power affects women’s gender identity at work. 
There are clearly opportunities for institutional theorists to provide insight into the ways in 
which organizational forms are related to particular identities. Work that similarly examines 
links with race, disability, sexuality, age, and so on would also be highly valued.  
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Exploitation and Creation of New Identities 
Thanks to work on ‘total institutions’ we do have some knowledge of how certain 
organizational settings bestow particular identities on people (Wallace, 1971). For example, 
work on the military has revealed how this service offers men unique resources for 
constructing a masculine identity defined by emotional control, physical fitness, self-
discipline, the willingness to use violence, and risk taking. These characteristics are in line 
with the hegemonic ideal present in the wider institutional context (Hinojosa, 2010). 
On the other hand, in order to survive in ‘total’ institutions, old, complex identities formed in 
the ‘normal’ world need to be covered up. Research on prisons highlights the radical identity 
changes that ensue there (Berger, 1963). Similarly, the Bank of Scotland case revealed how 
individuals had developed particular identities that were crucially compatible with the 
decisions they made, from being risk averse, to aggressively pursuing merger opportunities, 
to embracing a strategy of high-pressure selling of new products (Perman, 2013). Lipsky’s 
(2003: 145) four-year ethnography of West Point vividly describes the process of identity 
construction, from how on their first day the cadets have to strip down to their underwear, 
have their hair cut off, put on a uniform and address an older cadet with the proper salute and 
with the statement: “Sir, New Cadet Doe reports to the cadet in the Red Sash for the first time 
as ordered.” The new cadets must stand and salute and repeat, and stand and salute and 
repeat, until they get it exactly right, all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake. 
This is the beginning of the process in which they surrender their old identity and assume a 
new one. 
Indeed, organizational membership often requires shedding old identities and assuming new 
ones. For instance, Sasson-Levy (2002) highlights how women in masculine roles are found 
to accept the model of hegemonic masculinity and employ a series of discursive and bodily 
practices to shape their identity accordingly. This ‘identity work’ has been observed in other 
organizations as well. Gray and Kish-Gephart (2013) have highlighted how employees carry 
their class identities into organizations, a phenomenon that results in visible identity-based 
dynamics in organizational life. Members of upper and lower classes experience and make 
sense of organizational life differently. For example, concerned about ‘symbolic threats’ to 
their identity in organizations, members of lower classes will often try to obscure their own 
class background, or devise coping strategies such as referring to middle and upper classes as 
incompetent but lucky. In this way, they counteract their own fear of denigration and negative 
evaluation by elites. 
At a societal level, identities are also created by the dominant classes to extend and legitimize 
their domination. The work on colonialism, for example, is particularly instructive in this 
regard. To justify the colonization of a people, images are often created so that the 
subjugation makes sense. These images become the identity of the colonized. Amongst 
various things that the colonized come to believe are that they are lazy, backward and 
unimaginative. Such images become excuses for the colonial situation with the white man’s 
burden seeming a legitimate one. Such myths valorize the colonizers and humble those who 
are colonized. Meager wages for the colonized, lower privileges, and a life of subordination 
are all justified through such discursive means.   
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These literatures highlight how colonization creates and is sustained by the creation of 
identities of both the colonized and the colonizer (Said, 1977). The colonized develop 
negative identities – coming to see themselves as lesser beings who do not deserve more 
resources or increased participation in societal affairs (Fanon 1963). Such identities enable 
the colonial apparatus to go largely unchallenged, and are a result of affective behavioral, 
cognitive, linguistic and cultural mechanisms designed to solidify political domination 
(Prilleltensky & Gonick, 1996).  
 
Other Mechanisms of Reinforcement of Inequality 
Socialization and domination both require creation of identities, but there are other 
mechanisms for reinforcement and transmission of inequality too. The two that institutional 
theorists will be most familiar with are myth and ceremony (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
Elites cultivate identities that allow them to sustain and legitimize their privileged position in 
organizations.  The dominant discourse of meritocracy allows elites to reject the notion that 
‘the game is rigged’ (Schwalbe, 2008). By invoking the meritocracy argument, which 
suggests that top management positions, fame, and fortune are all ‘earned’ through hard work 
and cleverness, elites legitimize their identities. They rely on “autobiographical reasoning” 
(Scully & Blake-Beard, 2006: 436) to project onto everyone their own experience of success, 
which they attribute to individual effort and ability, assuming that others’ circumstances and 
capabilities are similar to their own.  
Rituals play a key role in how the elites come to internalize their identities.  Privileged and 
non-privileged positions are of course in part a result of societal logics that cultivate 
particular identities. For instance, in their study of formal dining at Cambridge University, 
Dacin et al. (2010) point out how the production of particular identities in organizations is 
central to the perpetuation of unequal social structures that allow privileged groups to 
maintain their positions at the top. They argue that rituals socialize participants into particular 
norms and values and teach them the roles they are expected to play. The ritual of college 
dining historically reflected the British class system in the sense that Fellows and students 
were drawn almost exclusively from its upper reaches and served by waiters and butlers 
whose primary objective was to protect the privilege of the former. Participants were 
therefore familiar with the performance and how to enact its main aspects before their arrival 
at Cambridge. Moreover, they essentially took for granted the notion of a class structure and 
their place in it. More recently however, as the social backgrounds of participants became 
increasingly diverse, the purpose of the ritual changed: it now subtly socialized the 
participants into adopting the sensibilities that made the elite distinct. In particular, it 
legitimated social stratification and an explicit categorization of people according to rank and 
station. In short, it endorsed and reified the concepts that lay at the core of the class system. 
In this sense, organizational rituals were seen to produce and maintain identities that 
sustained wider inequalities. 
 
Identity and Agency 
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In addition to being a device for categorization and legitimization as we examine above, 
identity can also serve as a mechanism for challenging existing classification systems. 
Indeed, the assumption of new identities at a collective level is often a hallmark of 
revolutionary and social movements aimed at reducing inequality. Discourses creating and 
emphasizing particular collective identities aimed at ending the domination of the elites may 
become contentious. An example is Margaret Thatcher’s aversion to the usage of the term 
‘class’ - she preferred the terms individual or family, viewing class as a ‘divisive’ term. Such 
distinctions may also be observed in organization theory with labor process theorists 
preferring to use the term ‘labor’ where others would have used employees or human 
resources (Braverman, 2003). In short, assumptions about and consciousness of particular 
identities can serve to sustain or destabilize existing relations of inequality. Identity then is a 
crucial and understudied construct in understanding the creation, perpetuation and 
destabilization of unequal social orders. Institutional theorists are ideally poised to study the 
creation of particular identities and their implication in the maintenance of particular social 
orders. This requires a heightened sensitivity to the maintenance of unequal power relations 
underpinning particular institutional orders (Munir, 2014) and the factors constraining the 
agency of the oppressed. 
 
Conclusion 
Inequality has increased dramatically since 1980 with the ability of those with the most 
wealth to continue to capture more of it, at the expense of those with significantly less, 
remarkable (Oxfam, 2016; Piketty, 2014; Saez & Zucman, 2014). Accompanying this rise in 
inequality has been a growing amount of commentary, predominantly from economists and 
sociologists, into the levels of inequality and the associated consequences for various groups 
in our societies. Organization theorists in general, and institutional theorists in particular, by 
contrast, have been largely absent from these debates. Thus, our purpose in this chapter has 
been to uncover where, and how, institutional theorists might effectively contribute to our 
understanding of inequality. In this concluding section, we offer a brief recapitulation of our 
theorizing and make suggestions as to where institutionalists might direct their lines of 
inquiry. 
We have focused our attention on four strands of the institutional literature that have 
particular promise in opening up new understandings of why inequality has become so 
entrenched in society. The first of these involves examining the institutional 
microfoundations of inequality. Inequality is enacted and experienced through the everyday, 
often mundane, unquestioned activities of individual actors. These activities become routine 
and taken-for-granted over time through processes of habitualization and legitimization. As 
yet, however, we have little understanding of how these processes take place, and in 
particular how they impact inequality. We therefore feel that there are several questions that 
could be profitably addressed. For example, it would be useful to know how elites are able to 
draw on existing power arrangements to reproduce practices that maintain their positions of 
advantage over others in society. Second, what forms of institutional work are engaged in by 
those in different strata in society – both deliberately and inadvertently – that reinforce 
inequality? A third useful point of investigation would be into how the structures and 
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practices within organizations resulting in hierarchical divisions become reinforced and 
taken-for-granted. 
Our second conceptual area of focus draws attention to the ways in which discourse helps 
reinforce societal divisions. Our central contention here is that inequality is not maintained by 
brute force, but rather requires continuous legitimization through the use of an interrelated 
system of discourses that collectively justify a particular social order. However, as yet we 
have little understanding of how discourses are deployed by powerful stakeholders to 
maintain their power. Thus, a useful first point of inquiry would be to map over time the 
ways by which different discourses are constructed and invoked to maintain intra and inter-
organizational inequality. Second, institutional theorists could assume a more critical 
perspective and question the market-based paradigm that dominates most aspects of our 
society. This is important because there is an increasingly clear relationship between market-
based exchanges and the creation of inequality. For example, the ways in which markets have 
been imposed on public sector organizations has been a notable feature of government 
policies in several countries over the last four decades. Understanding the discourses that are 
implicated in such transference would undoubtedly be a valuable addition to our 
understanding of inequality. A third line of investigation could be to uncover the ways in 
which power is used in the construction of, and becomes manifest through, different 
discourses in ways that retain systems of advantage and disadvantage. 
Institutional logics, our third focal point, has become important in helping uncover the ways 
in which ways of thinking, decision making and behaving combine to create courses of action 
that are not only viewed as the ‘obvious’ way to proceed, but also to establish others as 
illegitimate if not unthinkable. This, of course, is particularly important when we think about 
how the day-to-day activities that we described in the first section, and the discourse 
discussed in the second section, help reify structures of inequality. While there has been 
much discussion about how logics help determine particular courses of action, there has been 
virtually no explicit attention given to the links between institutional logics and inequality. 
There are several avenues of potentially valuable research that are open to exploration. First, 
investigation of the emergence of different logics and their corresponding connection to 
societal inequalities would be particularly useful. The rise, and dominance, of market logics 
is perhaps the most obvious starting point here, though there are other kinds of logics that als 
demand attention for the ways in which they pervade organizational life and exacerbate 
inequality. Second, the processes by which policies in private, public and non-profit 
organizations are developed such that they not only reflect dominant societal logics, but also 
act as carriers of them, is also a theoretically important question into which we as yet we have 
little insight. Third, the ways in which certain logics in complex fields become more or less 
influential over time is ill-understood: research in this area should thus have great potential 
for advancing not only our understanding of inequality, but institutional change processes 
more generally. 
In the fourth theoretical component of the chapter, we demonstrate how the construction and 
legitimization of particular identities is inherently linked to unequal social structures. From 
class dynamics in the workplace through to distinctions based on gender, race, age, sexuality, 
disability, and so on, it is clear that identity plays heavily into the processes through which 
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inequalities are legitimized. Again, this leads to several potential areas by which institutional 
theorists can contribute to our understanding of inequality. First, it would be immensely 
useful if we could better understand the ways in which identities become ensconced from 
early childhood through the activities of institutions such as families, schools, universities – 
including business schools – and local communities. Second, the role of organizations in 
bestowing identities on particular stakeholders in ways that privilege some groups over others 
is not well understood and thus warrants attention. Third, while much work has viewed 
identity as stable and monolithic, there is undoubtedly the potential for flexibility and some 
level of malleability, so it is certainly possible that identity could be a mechanism for 
challenging existing systems of inequality. Again, this is a dynamic of which we have, as yet, 
little understanding.  
As laid out above, each of the four areas upon which we have focused offers insights into 
inequality, and the potential for further fruitful lines of research. Moreover, as our 
institutional interpretations are made explicit, the policy implications should follow. In this 
respect, institutionalists are well positioned to make purposeful practical, as well as 
theoretical, interventions, something previously the preserve of other social scientists. It is 
also worth pointing out that, while we treat each of the four institutional topics in isolation, 
much as they have been developed in the literature, how they might be used in combination 
demands attention. While all four offer the potential to examine the antecedents and 
outcomes of inequality at different levels, from individual to societal, each tends to 
preference one level over another: logics, for example, have been considered more macro 
while microfoundations are, unsurprisingly, more micro in orientation. Similarly, we might 
find that discourse is consumed and interpreted individually in some settings whereas identity 
is collectively enacted. Adopting a multi-perspective approach has, therefore, much potential. 
Whether singly or in combination, it is apparent that each of these aspects of institutionalism 
has much to contribute to our understanding of inequality. We hope that this chapter proves 
to be useful in providing impetus to such much needed research.  
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